However, patients without insurance or the ability to pay out of pocket are difficult to place into long-term care. Low-wage, undocumented workers such as Mr. Jiménez are not eligible for public benefits programs such as Medicaid, 10 typically do not receive health insurance through their employers, and do not earn enough to pay for services themselves.
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Not surprisingly, Martin Memorial was unable to find a long-term care facility that would receive Mr. Jiménez. The hospital's proposed alternative was to "discharge" Mr. Jiménez back to his home country of Guatemala, above the objections of his guardian.
The litigation that ensued, which will be discussed in greater detail below, garnered national media attention and cast a spotlight on a practice that had been happening quietly for many years in hospitals across the country. Indeed, shortly after The New York Times published a lengthy cover story on Mr. Jiménez's case in August 2008, 12 our New York-based office began receiving calls about undocumented patients in the New York City area who were at risk of being repatriated or who simply were not being accepted by hospices and nursing homes due to their immigration status. What we quickly discovered in attempting to handle these calls was how little we and others knew about the resources available, the scope of the problem, or the strategies that could (or should) be used in response.
In an effort to better grapple with the problem, the Health Justice Program at New York Lawyers for the Public Interest ("NYLPI") along with the New York Immigration Coalition ("NYIC"), and the New York Academy of Medicine ("NYAM") decided to convene a statewide workgroup on medical repatriation and long-term care for undocumented immigrants. The workgroup consists of legal services providers from the fields of health law, immigration, and disability rights; concerned health care and other service providers; researchers; and representatives from government agencies, national advocacy groups and local community-based organizations. 13 The goal of the workgroup is to better understand why hospitals engage in the practice of medical repatriation, how often they do so, and what should be done in response in both the short-and long-term. 14 In this Article, we share our workgroup's approach to understanding and addressing medical repatriation in the hope that some of what we have learned in New York will inform the advocacy of practitioners elsewhere. We should emphasize at the outset that our essay does not put forward any definitive solutions, legal or otherwise, to the practice of medical deportation. Rather, our focus is on describing the workgroup's process and on outlining some of the tentative conclusions we have been able to draw from this process. Medical repatriation poses a veritable minefield of complications for advocates concerned with immigrant rights or health policy, and passions run high on both sides of the debate. A degree of deliberateness and caution in developing "answers" to the problem is warranted, and this is reflected in both the approach of our workgroup and in this Article.
Part I shares the findings of a series of structured interviews we conducted with health care providers, community advocates, and hospital social workers, which provide very preliminary data on the scope of the medical repatriation problem in New York and the reasons for its persistence. Part II discusses strategies that emerge out of the factual research we have conducted thus far. Part III concludes with a discussion of the recently enacted health care reform bill and the implications, if any, it may have for medical repatriation as well as with a discussion of the communications challenges that remain on the workgroup's agenda if we are to make meaningful progress in providing care to some of the country's must vulnerable patients.
Part I: The Problem
No reliable data exist on the frequency with which medical repatriations take place, 15 making systemic policy advocacy difficult. In order to get a better sense of the extent to which 13 New York hospitals engaged in the practice, staff from NYLPI and the NYIC conducted two dozen structured interviews over the course of six months with advocates, health care providers, and hospital social workers throughout the New York metropolitan area to find out whether hospitals in the state were repatriating patients to their home countries, how often, and why. 16 The interviews fulfilled two goals: (1) to collect data and anecdotal information from practitioners on the frontlines of health advocacy and delivery and (2) to conduct outreach and inform practitioners about the efforts of the working group and to recruit new participants. Our results revealed some interesting patterns with respect to both the scope and source of the problem in New York. Most notably, we found that health care providers admitted to repatriating uninsured immigrant patients, but they said they did so only if the patients or their representatives agreed to such a discharge-an unexpected finding given highly-publicized cases such as Mr. Jiménez's, where repatriation took place despite the guardian's objections. In addition, we heard from many health care providers that the practice of medical repatriation is rooted in deep structural and financial problems within the health care delivery system, but we also discovered some low hanging fruit: cases in which mere compliance with existing patients' rights laws could have (and did) prevent repatriations from occurring. The trends revealed in our survey, some counter-intuitive and others not, provide the critical data to guide our advocacy in both the short-and long-term.
a. Scope of the Problem
Of the interviews we conducted, almost half were with health care providers and hospital social workers, and these interviewees reported that they saw between two and four cases per year in which an undocumented patient was faced with potential or actual repatriation. The practice thus seems to be employed consistently if not frequently. More notably, the hospitalbased interviewees we spoke with said they would not repatriate an immigrant patient against her wishes, and they tended to provide anecdotal information about "voluntary" medical repatriations only-that is, cases in which patients or their representatives provided some form of consent. The two cases of involuntary repatriation that were reported during our survey both came from staff at an advocacy organization.
This emphasis on voluntary repatriation may be an accurate reflection of the frequency with which patients are choosing to be returned to their home country instead of being forced to do so, or it could indicate a flaw in our survey methodology, in that hospital staff may be uncomfortable revealing that they have repatriated an individual against his or her will to surveyors from immigrant advocacy organizations. More research would certainly need to be done to better understand and refine these results, but the fact that so-called voluntary repatriations are being pursued with regularity suggests that the nature of consent provided in these cases also requires exploration.
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Throughout this section, the names and affiliations of interviewees were omitted to protect confidentiality. All notes and records of these interviews are on file with the authors. It is worth noting that our most informative interviews were with hospital social workers, who straddle the line between hospital employee and patient advocate and are frequently in charge of crucial aspects of discharge planning such as billing, finding family, researching post-acute facilities, and contacting consulates and health care facilities in other countries. Advocates in other areas looking to conduct similar surveys of medical repatriation practices in their areas would be well-advised to focus their research on hospital social workers.
As one commentator has noted, groups like the California Medical Association ("CMA") and the American Medical Association ("AMA") "have focused on 'forced' repatriations without defining the word 'forced. '" 17 In practice, it is unclear whether patients are advised about the immigration or even the full medical consequences of their agreeing to be sent back home, raising questions about the meaningfulness of the consent provided in these cases.
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A host of consent issues also arise in cases where the patient is in a coma or has a severe mental disability and a guardian has been appointed. For example, in a case with which our office was briefly involved, Kong Fong Yu, an elderly, undocumented man from China, suffered a stroke and found himself in a New York hospital for almost two years before the hospital began considering repatriation.
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The temporary guardian who was appointed for Mr. Yu opposed the hospital's proposed plan to return him to China. However, during the course of our limited involvement with the case, questions arose about whether Mr. Yu himself had expressed a desire to return to China as well as the extent of the guardian's power.
20
The need to ensure that Mr. Yu had access to appropriate medical care and a reasonable discharge option rubbed up against concerns that his autonomy as a person with disabilities be respected.
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An extensive system of guardianship law exists in New York and throughout the country to navigate these tensions, 22 but cases of medical repatriation have yet to be addressed within this context. It has been proposed that to ensure consent in medical repatriation cases is informed and valid, hospitals could be required to inform patients about the possible immigration consequences of being returned to their home country, much the same way non-citizen defendants in criminal court are protected by statutes requiring them to be notified of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea. See id. at 154. A member of our workgroup has emphasized that patients should also be informed about the medical consequences of being sent to their home country before they are asked to consent to such a move. REV. 157, 157 (2010) (arguing that, "in most cases, it would be preferable to support decision making rather than supplant it through guardianship").
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Under New York's guardianship law, it is recognized "that it is desirable for and beneficial to persons with incapacities to make available to them the least restrictive form of intervention which assists them in meeting their needs but, at the same time, permits them to exercise the independence and self-determination of which they are capable." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2010) .
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See Wolpin, supra note 15, at 153 (observing that "[t]he legal and ethical boundaries for proceeding with a medical repatriation for a patient unable to personally consent have not been fully resolved by either statutory or common law . . . .").
These and a number of other thorny problems regarding consent must be addressed in the emerging advocacy and scholarship on medical repatriation if, as our survey results indicate, the majority of patients returned to their home countries do so by "choice." Though voluntary repatriations may seem morally and ethically more palatable than involuntary ones, the distinction is somewhat meaningless until the nature of the consent needed in these cases is better understood and defined.
b. Sources of the Problem
In addition to interviewing hospital staff and advocates about the frequency with which they had to deal with medical repatriation, we also asked them about the reasons why repatriations were pursued. The responses we received fell into two broad categories: (1) problems with the health care delivery system as a whole and (2) problems with systems and practices at individual hospitals. The first category of issues may require long-term policy solutions, but the latter set of concerns are easier to address and may, therefore, provide the basis for short-term improvements for non-citizen patients facing repatriation.
i. Gaps in the Health Care Delivery System
Not surprisingly, we heard from many of those surveyed-and, in particular, from health care providers themselves-that there is a lack of appropriate and affordable long-term care options for the undocumented individuals who are uninsured, which consequently forces hospitals to consider repatriation as a discharge option of last resort. In New York City, the Coler-Goldwater facility of the Health and Hospitals Corporation ("HHC"), the city's public hospital system, is the only nursing home that has charity care beds. A staff member from the finance department at Coler-Goldwater whom we interviewed estimated that the facility accepts between 10 and 20 undocumented immigrants in need of long-term care per year, but now that Coler-Goldwater is operating at full capacity it is becoming a less viable option for hospitals seeking to discharge their uninsurable patients.
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Where public institutions are unable to accommodate enough patients, non-profit organizations sometimes try to fill the gap. One faith leader we interviewed noted that because of her reputation and networks within the provider community, she is often able to negotiate with physicians and facilities for affordable care. Another interviewee from a community-based organization said that they sometimes are able to find families to house patients in need of long-term care who do not have family of their own. Measures such as these are, however, ad hoc, unfunded, and rather unstable.
If the patient does not have anyone who can take care of her outside the hospital, such as family members, the default solution is to house her as an inpatient in the acute care facility, which is both medically sub-optimal and can cost as much as $10,000 to $15,000 per day-that is, $3.65 million to $5.47 million per year per patient.
25
In the case of indigent, undocumented immigrants, hospitals see very little direct reimbursement for this care. With a few important 24 Moreover, for many patients, a nursing home may not be the appropriate discharge option. Funneling these patients from one form of institutional care to another does not necessarily "solve" the problem. exceptions, which will be discussed below, undocumented immigrants in New York State are not eligible for Medicaid except in emergencies, 26 and the definition of "emergency medical condition" for Medicaid reimbursement purposes is quite narrow, making it unlikely that emergency Medicaid alone will compensate hospitals for prolonged care provided to undocumented patients.
27
The care that is not directly reimbursed is theoretically covered by the state's bad debt and charity care pool, 28 but hospitals in New York operate at such tight margins -just over 1 percent in recent years-thus, providing uncompensated care nevertheless creates financial pressure.
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Undocumented immigrants are hardly the only patients to whom high-cost charity care is provided, but given the hostile political climate around immigration these days, they serve as convenient scapegoats for larger problems within the healthcare system. 30 Indeed, in some of our interviews, the issue of providing care for undocumented immigrants with serious health conditions was framed in terms of the life of the hospital, not the patient. Without adequate reimbursement, the doors of the hospital might have to be closed altogether. Viewed in this way, hospital administrators may decide it is in their financial interest to send the patient back to his country of origin than to continue to care for him, even paying full price for the cost of an air ambulance or procuring private donors and foundations to fund the patient's transport. 31 ii.
Gaps in Hospital Systems
In addition to the large-scale infrastructure and resource constraints described above, our structured survey also revealed a number of systems failures within individual hospitals that contribute to medical repatriation and that have far more tractable policy solutions. In particular, interviewees identified as factors the failure of hospital staff to understand immigrant eligibility for public benefits programs and their failure to follow pre-existing discharge planning and language access laws.
Immigrant Benefits Eligibility
Advocates we interviewed noted that health providers, particularly frontline staff like social workers, often lack sufficient knowledge about immigrant eligibility for programs such as See 42 U.S.C. § 1369b(v)(3) (2010) (defining "emergency medical condition" for the purposes of Medicaid reimbursement as "a medical condition (including emergency labor and delivery) manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in-(A) placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy, (B) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (C) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part."). Oct. 1, 2009 , available at 2009 (noting that "the issues in the Jimenez case are neither unique nor limited to undocumented immigrants . . . . The South Florida case gained widespread media attention because of the heated debate over illegal immigration in general, and the costs of providing health care specifically"). 31 Martin Memorial estimated that it cost approximately $1.5 million to keep Luis Jiménez at their facility, making the $30,000 they spent to send him back to Guatemala appear affordable in comparison. Sontag, Immigrants, supra note 2.
Medicaid, with the result that providers may assume some patients have fewer domestic discharge options than they actually do. The confusion stems largely from the fact that, in New York, some non-citizen patients can qualify for Medicaid benefits if they are deemed to be "Permanently Residing Under Color of Law" (or, "PRUCOL").
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The term refers to "an alien who is residing in the United States with the knowledge and permission or acquiescence of the federal immigration agency and whose departure from the U.S. such agency does not contemplate enforcing." 33 Formerly a federal immigrant eligibility category as well, PRUCOL was eliminated by the 1996 federal welfare reform law and now only exists as a basis for benefits eligibility in a few states, including New York.
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There are a number of ways that patients can establish PRUCOL status in order to secure Medicaid benefits in New York. For instance, one may use documentation acquired under the Freedom of Information Act indicating that an immigration application has been filed and has thus far received no response. An individual may also apply for deferred action status on humanitarian grounds, arguing that her medical condition is such that deportation could result in serious harm or death in transport or upon arrival.
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If U.S. Customs and Immigration Services ("USCIS") does not respond in a timely manner, and the patient makes a status inquiry and still receives no response, she may apply for and receive Medicaid.
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However, pursuing a deferred action is risky because it has the effect of notifying USCIS that an individual is present in the country illegally and therefore renders her vulnerable to a deportation action that may not have occurred without the deferred action application.
Though PRUCOL, eligibility offers a crucial avenue to benefits for non-citizen immigrants, hospital staff, and social workers, especially in private hospitals, lack the training to recognize PRUCOL eligible patients. In one case that we learned about through our survey, an elderly patient was admitted to an emergency room with back problems, but the doctors discovered stage four breast cancer instead. After the initial operation and radiation treatment, the patient was denied emergency Medicaid for further care. The hospital reached out to a public benefits attorney in the area to determine if the patient was eligible for Medicaid. While the attorney was investigating the possibility of PRUCOL, however, the hospital became impatient to discharge the patient and devised a plan to return her to her home country of St. Lucia. Luckily, the PRUCOL status was established before the hospital could proceed too far with its repatriation plans, and now the patient is receiving care in a nursing home near her daughter's home in New York.
According to our interviewees, cases such as these are not uncommon and It should be noted that dialysis is one of few conditions that immigration court judges will not grant deferred action on humanitarian grounds. Practitioners report that dialysis is available in most countries, even underdeveloped countries, and as such patients receiving dialysis are less likely to receive deferred action. reduced with better training of hospital staff regarding the intricacies of benefits eligibility or through better relationships between providers and advocates skilled in immigrant benefits work, such as in the case described above. In fact, it is not only in the best interest of the patient if hospitals are more sensitive to the relationship between immigration status and benefits eligibility. Hospitals also stand to see a direct benefit by being able to tap into a stream of financial reimbursement that they may have thought unavailable to them and by improving the ease with which they can discharge undocumented patients once the need for hospital-based care has ended.
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From the perspective of the health care system as a whole, it is far more efficient to obtain health insurance coverage for non-citizen patients and transition them into a domestic, non-acute facility than it is to house the patients for months, sometimes years, and then spend tens of thousands of dollars to send them to their home country. While PRUCOL is not a basis for Medicaid eligibility in most states, the fact that in New York it provides a relatively easy "fix" in these cases has broader policy ramifications: expanding public health insurance eligibility to more immigrants, rather than less, can save health care institutions money that they can put to use elsewhere.
Language Barriers in Discharge Planning
Advocates we interviewed also noted that language creates a barrier for many non-citizen patients in terms of their ability to understand their rights during the discharge process and to challenge discharges that might be inappropriate or unwelcome.
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Under New York state law, all hospitals must use a standardized notice that informs the patient that she is to be discharged and explains the reasons why.
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The hospital must develop an "appropriate" discharge plan for the patient and provide it to her in writing. 40 And the hospital must inform the patient that she has the right to request a discharge review. 41 Unfortunately, according to advocates with whom we spoke, non-citizen patients do not consistently receive these protections, particularly if they are limited English proficient ("LEP") and the hospital fails to provide them with language assistance services. 42 The result is that patients "consent" to repatriation because they do not 37 For instance, one advocate told us about the case of a severely burned man who had been in the hospital for over a year, with the hospital assuming he was undocumented and only eligible for emergency Medicaid. Eventually, hospital staff contacted the advocate, who spoke with the man and learned that he had political asylum and was therefore eligible for public health benefits. The hospital could have saved itself hundreds of thousands of dollars had staff established his eligibility sooner, and the patient could have been discharged to a more appropriate facility rather than receiving care in the institutionalized setting of the hospital. 38 One advocate reported that she spent several hours a week explaining discharge rights and post-hospital care to the Spanish-speaking community members with whom she works. Another advocate at an organization serving the Haitian community in New York said that language barriers prevent many of her clients from understanding that a discharge policy even exists. realize they can appeal the discharge determination and plan, or they are unable to appeal effectively due to the language barrier.
In a case that several members of our workgroup handled, an undocumented immigrant patient was put at risk of repatriation due to the interplay of language barriers and the hospital's flawed discharge process. "Mr. S." had been receiving care at a hospital in Brooklyn for a severe head injury when hospital administrators decided that he needed to be discharged. The man's wife ("Mrs. S."), who was serving as his representative, spoke Spanish and very limited English, but was not given an interpreter during the discharge process despite repeated requests for one. Hospital staff nevertheless kept pressuring Mrs S. to take her husband to Mexico for care because the hospital would not be able to find a facility for him in the U.S. given his immigration status. Mrs. S. felt that her husband was not ready to leave the hospital, and certainly was not in a position to be transported to Mexico for care. Due to the language barrier, however, she felt constrained in her ability to challenge the hospital's discharge determination and turned to a local community-based organization for help. With the assistance of an advocate from this group, Mrs. S. was able to locate her husband's treating physician, who said he had recommended against discharge since Mr. S. still had fluid in his brain and was too unstable to be moved. Mrs. S. and the advocate were able to work with the treating physician to prevent Mr. S.'s discharge, which hospital administrators seemed to be pursuing for non-medical reasons. In this case, the hospital's failure to comply with existing language access and discharge planning laws betrayed a broader impatience on the part of hospital administrators to dispose of an inconvenient patient, regardless of the impact that discharge would have on his life or well-being. The intervention of an advocate, who was able to help Mrs. S. bridge the language divide and navigate the discharge process, helped lead to a better outcome, but her importance in the process raises troubling questions about what happens to patients who are unable to access the same kind of assistance and whether hospitals might "take advantage" of undocumented patients' many layers of vulnerability in the pursuit of economic efficiency.
c. Summary
From the start, the goal of our structured survey was to identify patterns related to the practice of medical repatriation that could inform advocacy and, perhaps, more formal research in the future. While our survey is by no means comprehensive, what has emerged from this effort is a clearer picture of the circumstances of patients facing medical repatriation. Already the victims of a medical calamity, they are confronted with exceedingly restricted "choices" about post-hospital care due to a health care system that interacts in toxic ways with immigration policy. What is more, undocumented patients are often denied the procedural protections and supportive services necessary to make the best of a terrible situation. In the next Part, we turn to the question of what may be done to assist patients like Mr. Jiménez and Mr. S and what role legal advocates in particular can play.
Part II: Developing Solutions
As the scope and nature of the medical repatriation problem in New York became clearer to our workgroup, we began to formulate some initial strategies to identify and assist patients in need. Our efforts in this regard have been focused on two areas: (1) the formation of a "rapid response team" to provide emergency intervention for individual patients facing medical repatriation and (2) research into legal theories that could be used to challenge the lawfulness of medical repatriation overall. Each of these approaches is discussed below. We present them in the hope of engaging with practitioners and scholars elsewhere who can help us refine our thinking or offer new ideas.
a. Rapid Response Team
As revealed in our survey, intervention by advocates at the point when a patient was imminently threatened with repatriation could dramatically alter the outcome of her case. Moreover, these interventions did not require extensive litigation or expenditure of resources, but simply an ability to navigate the public benefits and health care regulatory structure. The legal sub-committee of our workgroup thus began developing a "rapid response team" that would be responsible for intervening when individual cases involving repatriation arise-a strategy recommended by a number of the individuals we interviewed in our survey as well.
Although we are still in the process of creating the model for our rapid response team, the structure we are starting with will involve volunteers from various public interest legal organizations who have expertise in different issue areas, such as immigration, public benefits, and health law. When a case arises, the team may write letters to or negotiate with hospital administrators personally to discourage hasty repatriation. The team would also advise the patient and/or his family or guardian regarding patients' rights during the discharge process and assist in appealing discharge determinations or plans that are objectionable. Ideally, members of the team would be able to screen patients regarding public insurance eligibility when hospital personnel may have failed to do so properly. In cases where a hospital insists on repatriation, the team could pursue temporary restraining orders ("TRO") and injunctions using template motion papers and petitions that have been adapted to individual cases.
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In the process of advocating for the client, the team may address other ancillary legal issues that arise from a patient's case. These issues may include immigration services, advocacy with city and federal agencies, and referrals to other social services.
In addition to the legal component, the workgroup contemplates incorporating physicians and other social service providers into the rapid response team. These non-legal members of the response team could advise patients on the medical consequences of being repatriated back to their home country, and their evaluations in this regard could also be used to challenge the appropriateness of particular discharge plans. Put another way, the medical arm of the legal 43 In federal practice, a TRO is filed to maintain the status quo until the court rules on an accompanying demand for a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction preserves the status quo for the rest of the lawsuit. MICHAEL C. SILBERBERG, EDWARD M. SPIRO, & JUDITH L. MOGUL, 1 CIVIL PRACTICE IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK § 12.2 (2d ed. rev. ed. 2010), available at 1 SDNYCIVP 12:2 (Westlaw) (discussing differences between TROs and preliminary injunctions in terms of duration, procedural requirements, and appealability). In New York State, a TRO is sought as a precursor to a preliminary injunction. David D. Siegel, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 330 (4th ed. 2009). Courts will issue a TRO pending a hearing for a preliminary injunction "where it appears that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result unless the defendant is restrained before the hearing can be had". N. response team would offer a "second opinion" for patients facing voluntary or involuntary repatriation and would help ensure that both patients and providers make more thoughtful decisions about the most appropriate discharge plan. The cases the rapid response team works on would add to the larger workgroup's knowledge of how and why medical repatriation cases arise, information that will hopefully influence future policy recommendations.
Once the rapid response team is established, members of the workgroup will conduct outreach into immigrant communities to educate patients and their families about their rights and about the availability of the team's services. Collectively, the agencies represented in the workgroup have relationships with hundreds of community-based organizations serving immigrant New Yorkers and extensive experience providing know-your-rights trainings and similar education workshops to low-income, undocumented, and limited English proficient immigrant groups, among others. We anticipate that the educational workshops that will be conducted will focus, broadly, on patients' discharge rights rather than on the specific issue of medical repatriation. The reason for this is based on feedback we received from communitybased advocates when the Jiménez case broke in the media: the story of hospitals engaging in "deportations" provoked fear among many immigrant community members, who became hesitant to seek health care services when needed. We certainly do not want our trainings to stoke these fears further. By framing our education workshops on discharge generally, we will hopefully be able to reach our intended audience without creating the impression that immigrants are being rampantly targeted for negative or hostile treatment by health care institutions. Recognizing that not all immigrants who are at risk for medical repatriation have families or community support networks to assist them, we will also continue to build relationships with the hospital social workers we interviewed as part of our survey so they feel comfortable reaching out to our workgroup for assistance and resources well before a patient is threatened with a return to his or her home country.
b. Challenging the Legality of Medical Repatriation
The rapid response team is designed to intervene in individual cases relatively early on and work within the existing legal and regulatory structure to prevent or at least delay repatriation if that is what the patient wants. The work of the team would not, however, involve challenging the lawfulness or validity of medical repatriation as a practice. This is a far murkier area that the Jiménez case brought into full view, and that the legal sub-committee of our workgroup has also begun to evaluate in the event that we decide to pursue litigation contesting the use of medical repatriation in New York. In this section, we present a brief discussion of some of the federal legal theories that we have considered as a basis for challenging medical repatriation, including patient anti-dumping laws and federal discharge laws. 44 We frame the analysis presented in this section against the backdrop of the Jiménez case that, during the course of its eight year history, managed to raise a number of the major legal claims that seem applicable in these circumstances. The tortured procedural and factual history of the case also speaks to the challenges inherent in litigating an issue that is so novel and controversial: the Jiménez litigation began in November 2001, when Martin Memorial Hospital intervened in Mr. Jiménez's guardianship proceeding and filed a petition for judicial review, arguing that his guardian, Montejo Gaspar Montejo, was not acting in Mr. Jiménez's best interest by objecting to his repatriation to Guatemala.
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The ensuing legal dispute (hereinafter, "Montejo I") centered on the question of whether repatriation to a Guatemalan health care facility would be considered "appropriate" under federal discharge laws and the hospital's own discharge policy. 46 The trial court found in favor of the hospital and issued an order authorizing Mr. Jiménez's transport to Guatemala. 47 While the appeal was pending, however, hospital administrators placed Mr. Jiménez in an air ambulance and whisked him off to Guatemala.
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The appeals court later declared the trial court's order in Montejo I invalid, 49 which led to a second lawsuit (hereinafter, "Montejo II") seeking damages for false imprisonment. The final jury verdict in the false imprisonment action came out in favor of Martin Memorial Hospital.
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As the Jiménez litigation bounced up and down the Florida courts, it lurched immigrant advocates between hope and despondency. The outcome of the case was, of course, tragic: Mr. Jiménez now resides in his mother's mountain home in Guatemala with virtually nothing in the form of health care or other support services.
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And, as the discussion below will make clear, the legal arguments against medical repatriation are by no means strong. But much of the law that was decided in both Montejo I and Montejo II was quite positive and could create an opening for advocates interested in using the courts to place restraints on the practice of medical repatriation.
Patient Anti-Dumping Law
One of the reasons Luis Jiménez was able to get emergency care at Martin Memorial, despite his immigration status and indigence, is because federal and state patient anti-dumping laws exist to prevent hospitals from either refusing to provide emergency medical treatment to patients who are unable to pay or transferring them before their emergency conditions are stabilized. The federal anti-dumping law, known as the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), 52 was enacted in 1986 "to address the increasing number of reports that hospital emergency rooms [were] Sontag, Immigrants, supra note 2 (noting that since Mr. Jiménez arrived at his elderly mother's home he "received no medical care or medication-just Alka-Seltzer and prayer").
individual . . . comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that the individual has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide" either (1) such medical examination and treatment required to stabilize the medical condition or (2) transfer of the individual to another medical facility, in accordance with certain restrictions laid out in the statute. 54 Unfortunately, given the way courts have interpreted EMTALA, it may be difficult to extend its protections to cases such as Mr. Jiménez's, where the hospital seeks to "dump" a patient who has been languishing in the hospital for years into an inadequate foreign long-term care facility. It might, however, provide a limited avenue for advocacy for individuals such as Mr. S., discussed above, who may not have been adequately stabilized before the hospital began considering repatriation.
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Under the EMTALA statute, " [t] o stabilize" an emergency medical condition involves determining "within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration of the condition is likely to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility . . . ."
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Courts have noted that the statute's definition of stability is not the same as the medical term, "stable condition." 57 Instead, it is possible for a patient to be in critical condition and still be "stabilized" under EMTALA.
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A determination that a patient is or is not stabilized is a factual one, and requires a "flexible standard of reasonableness that depends on the circumstances."
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For example, a patient with a life-threatening injury to the abdominal aorta was considered unstable for EMTALA purposes when the patient would not have survived an ambulance trip to another hospital.
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By contrast, another case concluded that a stroke victim was stabilized pursuant to EMTALA after she spent 21 days in the hospital, including time spent in the Intensive Care Unit and as a regular in-patient, even though her condition substantially deteriorated after discharge from the hospital.
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Furthermore, courts have very narrowly construed the scope of a hospital's duty to which they will accept payments from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") through the Medicare program, which in practice includes virtually all hospitals. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(2) (2010). 54 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (2010). An "emergency medical condition" is defined as "a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in: i) placing the health of the individual . . . in serious jeopardy, ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1) (2010).
The regulations define "sufficient severity" to also include psychiatric disturbances. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b) (2010). In most of the cases we have seen in which medical repatriation arises, the presence of an emergency medical condition tends not to be in question, so we do not discuss it extensively here. Before pursuing this cause of action, advocates would be advised to research the relevant case law on how "emergency medical condition" is defined. Determining which illnesses fall within this category is a highly fact-specific determination.
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The EMTALA statute explicitly provides for a private right of action. See 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(d)(2) (2010) ("Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil action against the participating hospital, obtain those damages available for personal injury under the law of the State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable relief as is appropriate"). In addition, CMS may terminate a hospital's provider agreement through Medicare if it fails to meet the requirements of EMTALA's regulatory scheme. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(b)(2) (2010); 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(g) (2010 Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131 , 1134 (6th Cir. 1990 stabilize patients, finding that the duty only extends to the "immediate aftermath" of an emergency requiring treatment and to the interim period while the hospital considers whether to undertake longer-term full treatment or transfer the patient 62 -a position that was adopted in EMTALA regulations promulgated in 2003. 63 Though it is difficult to discern in the abstract, it is possible that individuals like Mr. S., who still had fluid in his brain and whose treating physician felt he was too fragile to move, would not be considered "stabilized" for the purposes of EMTALA. 64 However, given that Mr. S. and other patients in a similar position are usually admitted as inpatients-indeed, it is their admission and subsequent discharge that is at the heart of the medical repatriation problem-it is also quite possible that a court would find that the hospital's duty to stabilize was met.
Only after the patient is able to overcome the hurdle of showing that he had an emergency medical condition that was not stabilized can he potentially move to challenge the transfer to the international facility itself.
65
The analysis here would turn to a factual question of whether (1) the patient requested the transfer in writing or a physician or other qualified medical person certified that the benefits of transfer outweighed the risks and (2) the transfer was appropriate.
66
Under the EMTALA statute, an appropriate transfer merely requires that the transferring hospital provide "the medical treatment within its capacity which minimizes the risks to the individual's health" and sends the receiving hospital relevant patient records. In addition, the receiving hospital must have available space and qualified personnel to treat the patient, while also agreeing to accept the transfer and provide appropriate medical treatment so long as the transfer is conducted with qualified personnel and transportation equipment (including life support measures). 67 Interestingly, in the Jiménez case, Martin Memorial satisfied all of these requirements, hiring a private air ambulance to transport Mr. Jiménez to Guatemala and allowing a nurse from the hospital to travel with him and personally deliver him to the National Hospital for Orthopedics and Rehabilitation in Guatemala City.
68
Hospitals may therefore be able to insulate themselves from liability under EMTALA in medical repatriation cases simply by following the required transfer procedures. See, e.g., Roberts v. Galen of Va., 111 F.3d 405, 410 (6th Cir. 1997 ) (genuine issue of fact existed regarding whether truck accident victim was stabilized enough, after 6-week stay, to be transferred to nursing home), rev'd on other grounds, 525 U.S. 249 (1999) , on remand at 112 F. Supp. 2d 638, 641 (2000) .
